A Tribute to Justice:

Justice DanielJ. O'Hern
The Hon. Alan B. Handler"
A tribute to Justice Daniel J. O'Hern is a tribute to justice. His
tenure on the New Jersey Supreme Court was like no other. For
nineteen years and more than 230 opinions, he left a distinctive
imprint of sagacity and erudition leavened always with common
sense. His approach was invariably marked by compassion and
fairness. Justice O'Hern would view the law from a broad perspective
shaped by a strong sense of judicial tradition and a special
appreciation of history, but he never lost sight of the commonplace
and ordinary-that an opinion must be able to explain simply and
clearly the solution for a current controversy.
Justice O'Hern came to the Court in 1981. He came with a
background rich with experience-he had long served the public.
He was Special Counsel to Governor Brendan T. Byrne at the time of
his appointment, and before that he was the Commissioner of the
Department of Environmental Protection. Justice O'Hern had a
strong sense of place and roots. He was born and raised in Red Bank,
New Jersey, and remained throughout his life firmly grounded in the
area in which he grew up. Prior to his service in state government, he
was deeply involved in municipal government, having first been a
councilman and then, for three successive terms, the Mayor of Red
Bank, over a span of eighteen years. Justice O'Hern also had
extensive experience in the private practice of law and from this he
brought to the Court an abiding interest in the practice of law and a
high regard for the legal profession. Justice O'Hern matriculated to
Fordham College. Thereafter, he served in the United States Navy.
Three years later he returned to take his legal studies at Harvard Law
School. Justice O'Hern capped his legal education when, in 1957, he
became a law clerk to Justice William J. Brennan. That was Justice
Brennan's first full term on the United States Supreme Court, and

Of Counsel, Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer; Associate Justice, New Jersey
Supreme Court (1977-1999).

1052

A TRIBUTE TOJUSTICE O'HERN

1053

the clerkship experience and exposure to Justice Brennan had a
strong and lasting influence on Justice O'Hern.
I had the great, good fortune to be a colleague of Justice
O'Hern for eighteen years. That became one of the most enriching
experiences of my own life. Justice O'Hern never ceased to amaze
me, a unique mix of intellectual prowess and personal modesty.
There was no subject touched by the law that was not well within
Justice O'Hern's grasp, despite his protestations to the contrary. He
was not daunted by any case. At Supreme Court conferences, in the
course of reviewing petitions for certification, he might say diffidently
that a particular case was "too hard for us." He was kidding, of
course. His insights were both penetrating and expansive, yet there
was nothing distant or pedantic in his approach to the law. As he
once described his admired friend, Justice Hayden Proctor, Justice
O'Hern's every opinion displayed a genuine understanding of the
needs of ordinary people who must confront the larger institutions of
government, police, insurance companies, or employers.'
Justice O'Hern revered the law, yet was completely comfortable
with it. His mastery of the law cannot be explained simply by way of
summary or illustration. A few examples, however, may give us a
glimpse of the enormous talent and rich character of this great
justice, a sense of the full range and depth of his contributions to our
jurisprudence.
Subjects that were technical and exacting, no matter in what
context they were presented, were not beyond the ken of Justice
O'Hern.

In Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Insurance Co.,2 for example,

Justice O'Hern took great pains to explain the complex coverages of
tiered, layered, and successive general liability insurance policies for
claims attributable to continuous toxic exposures occurring over long
periods of time. He was cognizant of the enormity of the controversy
by pointing out that the principle insurer had settled 43,000 personal
injury suits and that 90,000 bodily injury suits were pending in many
states.3 He described the underlying core of this complex issue in
ordinary language:
What is not so easily understandable is the point at which the law
will say that injury requires indemnity. . . . IT] he concept of
injury, like the related concepts of duty and causation, is an
instrument of policy. After all, the air we breathe and the water
we drink contain trace elements of toxic substances. The law

2

Proceedings of the Supreme Court of NewJersey, 156 N.J. XLV, LXIX (1998).
138 N.J. 437 (1994).
See id. at 446.
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decides when an invasion of the body constitutes an injury
4
entitling one to damages.
Recognizing that "[the Court's] resolution of the issues is
necessarily imperfect.... [because] concepts of legal causation were5
biology, ,
developed in an age of Newtonian physics, not of molecular

Justice O'Hern proposed a pragmatic solution based on the
assumption of instantaneous injury from the inhalation of toxins. He
ruled that "the continuous-trigger theory" should be invoked "for
activating the insurers' obligation to respond under the policies" so
that "when progressive indivisible injury or damage results from
exposure to injurious conditions for which civil liability may be
imposed, courts may reasonably treat the progressive injury or
damage as an occurrence within each of the years of [the insurance]
policy."6
Another case, Instructional Systems, Inc. v. Computer Curriculum
Corp.,7 reflected Justice O'Hern's view that law must be relevant and
contemporary and must be topical and attentive to current needs. In
that case, which involved a business dispute over the sale,
distribution, and servicing of educational computer programs and
technology, Justice O'Hern traced the origins and evolution of
franchise practices from early common-law rules of freedom of
contract to the economic and commercial developments surrounding
current franchising. He found that even though the arrangements
might not conform to the traditional or prototypical franchises
exemplified by fast-food outlets, automobile dealerships, or gasoline
service stations, they possessed critical features of a franchise
relationship, including a community of interest entailing franchisespecific investments creating interdependence and vulnerability of
the distributor sufficient to apply the protections of the New Jersey
Franchise Practices Act. 9
Clear exposition, a reflection of clear thinking, was a hallmark of
a Justice O'Hern opinion. Justice O'Hern could elucidate guiding
legal principles with both exactitude and clarity. He articulated with
simple eloquence, in State v. Roth,' ° the principles of uniformity,
consistency, and fairness that animated the New Jersey Code of
4 Id. at 457.
5 Id. at 458.
6 Id. at 478.

130 N.J. 324 (1992).
s See id. at 338-41.
9 See id.at
357.
7

1095 N.J. 334 (1984); see also State v. Hodge, 95 N.J. 369 (1984) (same).
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Criminal Justice and explained with clarity the standards that govern
sentencing and appellate review of sentences, stating:
Pronouncement of judgment of sentence is among the most
solemn and serious responsibilities of a trial court. No word
formula will ever eliminate this requirement that justice be done.
There is no room for trial or appellate courts to consider the
public perceptions of sentences: 'Judicial recognition of or
action upon public opinion against a particular defendant cannot
be tolerated in our criminal justice system." . . . Our new Code

reflects a delicate balance between discretion and fixed
sentencing."
Justice O'Hern had an abiding commitment to the principles of
justice and fairness. This came through especially in the opinions of
Justice O'Hern in capital punishment cases. For example, in State v.
Nelson,12 a capital case, he ruled that the defendant, a disturbed
transsexual who shot police officers attempting to arrest her, was
entitled through discovery to know, in support of her mitigating
defense, that one of the surviving officers had sued the State for
damages, claiming that he and other police officers had been
inadequately trained in dealing with deranged persons. Viewing the
nondisclosure as material evidence of mitigation, Justice O'Hern
reversed the defendant's death sentence. This was reminiscent of the
philosophy expressed in a dissent by his mentor, Justice Brennan, in
1953, when still a member of the NewJersey Supreme Court:
It shocks my sense of justice that in these circumstances counsel
for an accused facing a possible death sentence should be denied
inspection of his confession which, were this a civil case, could not
be denied."3
Compassion and sympathy marked justice O'Hern's approach to
all controversies. He considered, in Williams v. Department of Human
Services,14 the plight of general assistance recipients who were
threatened with the loss of shelter through the automatic termination
of their emergency shelter assistance benefits upon the expiration of
a five-month limitation period under an administrative regulation.
He recognized that "[c]ourts

.

..

can act only in those rare

circumstances when it is clear that the agency action is inconsistent
with its legislative mandate." 5 Realizing that the Court "cannot
1 Roth, 95 N.J. at 365 (quoting State v. Humphreys, 89 N.J. 4, 15 (1982) (citation
omitted)).
2
155 N.J. 487 (1998).
3

State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 231 (1953) (Brennan,J., dissenting).
N.J. 102 (1989).

14 116
'5

Id. at 108.
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administer a vast social-service agency, nor, indeed, tell it how to do
its job,",6 Justice O'Hern concluded that the five-month waiting will

be "deemed valid" subject to conditions that require the agency to
"set in place ... through proper administrative procedures ....
new
programs that it believes will make reasonably certain that the
individuals previously housed in motels will have shelter and
eventually housing elsewhere." 7
That view reflected an extraordinary concern for the wellbeing
of people, both as individuals and as members of a family. (I pause to
observe that nothing in Justice O'Hern's life was more important to
him that his own family, and I have not the slightest doubt that his
love of family and religious faith were a wellspring for the empathy
and understanding that he brought to all cases involving familial
conflicts.) His decisions explored with great feeling and sensitivity
the poignant conflicts posed by the issues implicating a child's best
interests and a parent's rights. In the case of New Jersey Division of
Youth and Family Services v. A.W, "' he elucidated the standard for
determining when parents' rights could be terminated in the best
interests of their children. Observing that "[t] ermination of parental
rights presents the legal system with an almost insoluble dilemma,'",
and that "[a]s judges, it is our duty within constitutional bounds to
make the choice between [conflicting] policies as reflected in our
legislative scheme," 20 Justice O'Hern explained the operative standard
of the "best interests"' 1 of the child. He ruled that termination of
parental rights must be based on the determination, by clear and
convincing evidence, that "[t]he child's health and development
have been or will be seriously impaired by the parental
relationship";2 that "[t]he parents are unable or unwilling to
eliminate the harm and delaying permanent placement will add to
2 4
the harm";2

1

that there are no viable "alternatives to termination";

and that "termination of parental rights will not do more harm than
good. ,2 5 Those principles became the foundation for our current
laws, both statutory and decisional, that govern parental rights.
16

Id. at 109.

17

Id. at 121.

103 N.J. 591 (1986).

'J
20
21
2
23
24

25

Id. at 599.
Id. at 602.

See id. at 602-03.
Id. at 604.
Id. at 605.

New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services, 103 N.J. at 608.
Id. at 610.
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The cogency of Justice O'Hern's jurisprudence imparted to his
decisions an enduring influence. That is very evident in the field of
torts. In 1983, in Butler v. Acme Markets Inc., 26 the Court considered
the extent of a store owner's duty to protect its customers against the
criminal acts of third persons. Justice O'Hern determined that
although persons are not responsible for the criminal acts of others,
if those acts are foreseeable, and if it is not unduly oppressive or
unfair to take measures that could reduce or eliminate the risk of
such criminal acts, then there may be a duty imposed on a defendant
to exercise such reasonable care. That case has indeed become a
bedrock principle of tort law.
In another landmark case, Strawn v. Canuso,27 Justice O'Hern
ruled that a real estate broker with actual or constructive knowledge
of an off-site toxic dump, the existence of which would materially
affect the value of the property, had a duty to disclose that to the
prospective buyer. The explanation was direct and clear:
Location is the universal benchmark of the value and desirability
of property. Over time the market value of the property will
reflect the presence of the landfill. Professional builders and
their brokers have a level of sophistication that most home buyers
lack. That sophistication enables them better to assess the
marketability of properties near conditions such as a landfill, a
planned superhighway, or an office complex approved for
construction. With that superior knowledge, such sellers have a
duty to disclose to home buyers the location of off-site physical
conditions that an objectively reasonable and informed buyer
would deem material to the transaction, in the sense that the
conditions substantially affect the value or desirability of the
property.28
In a recent setting involving the law of products liability, the

Court was called upon to determine whether a drug manufacturer
that undertook direct-to-consumer advertising of its product, a
contraceptive called Norplant, was under a duty to wam its potential
consumers of the deleterious harmful side effects of its product, or
whether those drug manufacturers were relieved of such a duty to
warn by virtue of the defense of the learned intermediary doctrine, a
doctrine that would require physicians undertaking to prescribe the
drug for patients to bear the full responsibility of warning those
patients of the drug's harmful side effects. Justice O'Hern, in Perez v.

26
27
28

89 N.J. 270 (1982).
140 N.J. 43 (1995).
Id. at 66.
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Wyeth LaboratoriesInc.,2 took great pains to explain the origins of the
learned intermediary doctrine; he fully acknowledged the sound
reasons and strong policies that gave rise to that doctrine and how, in
30
many contexts, that doctrine served suitably to protect patients.
Nevertheless, he recognized the enormous changes that had
occurred in the marketing of medical products and drugs, and that
advertising through modern communications had a particularly
strong conditioning effect on potential consumers exposed to directto-consumer advertising. 31
He also emphasized the inherent
flexibility of the common law to respond to changing circumstances
and needs.3 2
Consequently, he ruled that pharmaceutical
manufacturers must include in their advertisements adequate
warnings of deleterious side effects.
Justice O'Hern had a firm grasp of the responsibilities of
government, the role of courts, and intergovernmental relationships.
In Williams, he expressed his sensitivity to the principles of
federalism; the Justice was mindful that citizens are governed by both
the state and the national government and that both must serve the
needs of society. That was also a strong theme in his Perez opinion.
Justice O'Hern acknowledged, in that case, that the manufacture and
sale of drugs was federally regulated and that the most appropriate
standard for determining the reasonableness of warnings reposed in
those governmental agencies that had the responsibility for their
regulation. Accordingly, he qualified the rule by noting that if a
manufacturer complied with federal regulations, those promulgated
by the Food and Drug Administration, it could be presumed, indeed
strongly presumed, that the manufacturer had given adequate
warnings.
The decision exemplifies Justice O'Hern's balanced
judgment. Justice O'Hern was largely responsible for the current
rule, still in an experimental stage, that would enable the New Jersey
Supreme Court to render opinions on issues of state law upon
certification to the federal courts of New Jersey through the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals. 3 It is a measure designed to foster greater
stability and consistency in the law when it is applied variously by
federal and state courts.
161 N.J. 1 (1999).
s See id. at 17-20.
31 See id. at 11-14.
32

See id. at 15 (referring to the evolutionary capacity of the common law to adapt

to modern conditions, as acknowledged by Judge Cardozo and recognized by the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability (1997)).

5 Rule 2:12A, Certification of Questions of Law by the Supreme Court (N.J.
Order 99-17, effectiveJan. 3, 2000).

20001

A TRIBUTE TO JUSTICE O'HERN

1059

Justice O'Hern was fascinated by the ordinary human qualities of
people. In a lecture given several years ago, he explored the lives and
accomplishments of two great jurists who were contemporaries:
Joseph Weintraub and William Brennan.34 He pointed out how
similar and different were both of those legal giants. In pondering
their differences, he was drawn to a critique of The PassionateSage, a
book concerning the legacy of John Adams, in which the reviewer
considers whyJohn Adam's legacy has been overshadowed by that of
Thomas Jefferson, who has "become a patron saint of American
thought."' 5 The explanation proffered was that Adams's political and
philosophical views grew directly out of his personality-he was a
realist when it came to assessing human nature and did not share
Jefferson's sunny optimism about democracy and human reason.
Adams's personality "impressed upon him the political importance of
control, balance, and the modulated supervision of social change, 3 6
while 'Jefferson, with a more confident faith in the American vision,
'reversed the dichotomy.' 3'
Thus, Adams and Jefferson, Justice
O'Hern quoted, "'shared a common vision of America's future but
emphasized different features of the vision .... The glass was always

half-full at Monticello and half-empty at Quincy, even though it was
the same glass.' 38 Justice O'Hern, I believe, blends both views-an
enormous respect for the role and responsibility of government in
preserving social order and advancing the common good, and an
enormous faith in the capacities and worth of each individual,
proceeding, as would Justice Brennan, with "'a sparkling
vision of
39
supremacy of the human dignity of every individual."
Justice O'Hern's sense of history, tradition, and culture was ever
present and at work. He would always place matters in perspective.
We were struck, for example, by how strongly Justice O'Hern reacted
to the collapse of communism in Czechoslovakia and the ascension to
the presidency of Vaclav Havel, the poet-playwright who led
Czechoslovakia into freedom. He repeated for us Havel's belief that
34

Daniel J. O'Hern, Some Reflections on the Roots of the DifferingJudicialPhilosophies

of William]. Brennan,Jr. andJoseph Weintraub, 46 RUTGERS L. REv. 1049 (1994).
35 Id. at 1067 (referring to Michiko Kakutani, The Vinegar
of the Revolutionary Salad,
N.Y.TIMES, May 14, 1993, at C28).
s6 Michiko Kakutani, The Vinegar of the Revolutionary Salad, N.Y. TIMES, May 14,
1993, at C28.

370'Hern, supra note 34, at 1068 (quotingJOSEPHJ.ELLIS, PASSIONATE SAGE: THE

CHARACTER AND LEGACY OFJOHN ADAMS 135 (1993)).
58 Id. at 1068 (quoting JOSEPH J. ELLIs, PASSIONATE SAGE:

THE CHARACTER AND

LEGACY OFJOHN ADAMS 239 (1993)).

39 Id. at 1066 (quoting Byron R. White, Tribute to the Honorable Williamj Brennan,

Jr., 100Yale L.J. 1113, 1116 (1991)).
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democracy required individuals committed to "living within the
truth" in order that law not serve as an instrument of oppression.
Justice O'Hern shared the constitutional vision of Justice
Brennan and strongly supported the constitutional basis for
individual rights. He believed that the Constitution itself is a part of
the law that is a living process responsive to changing human needs
and animated by a jurisprudence that recognizes human beings as
the most distinctive and important feature of the universe. Anyone
who is familiar with his judicial philosophy, Justice O'Hem also said,
knows that he had not advocated reliance on state constitutional
doctrine as the primary guarantor of liberties. In part, that view
stems from a realization of how easy it is to change a state
constitution, but also from an overwhelming sense of respect for the
United States Supreme Court-a respect that originated with his
early exposure to the High Court.
No one on the Court was more concerned than Justice O'Hern
about the Court's supervisory responsibilities over the practice of law.
He greatly respected the legal profession and honored the role of
lawyers. Justice O'Hern always expected the performance of lawyers
to meet high standards of competence and professionalism. He was
especially fair and tempered in cases of attorney discipline. Justice
O'Hern had a major hand in supporting and shaping the current
standards for professionalism.
He was justly honored by the
Commission on Professionalism in the Law for his pioneering efforts
in advancing professionalism and civility in the practice of law.
Reference to these few decisions and anecdotes hardly does
justice to the Justice. They are a mere tip of a vast iceberg. They
cannot fully reveal the full scope and depth of Justice O'Hern's
contributions to our law. They do exemplify, however, the salient
features of his judicial personality that dominated his vision of law. A
broad understanding of life and people. An educated worldliness. A
full awareness of society. A sharp and penetrating intellect-one not
daunted or deterred by the complexity or intricacies of any problem.
A comprehensive view of the courts and of government-he always
understood that our courts must be independent and vigilant in
serving the people of the state, yet must ever be mindful of
intergovernmental relationships as well as constraints and the
demands of federalism. A sense of history and tradition-he keenly
appreciated the tradition of the New Jersey Supreme Court. And he
brought to everything he did a modesty that shaded his excellence.
Justice O'Hern said this about his good friend, Justice Proctor:
"[H]is innate modesty and self-effacing manner [ ] makes difficult
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our vision of [the] Justice's excellence. It is like attempting to see a
distant star when the many lights are nearby."' He could have been
talking about himself. But, of course, he never would.
These things touch on only Justice O'Hern's more visible and
palpable contributions to the law. There are others. His colleagues
would turn to him for guidance and counsel. They admired the
broad reach of his perspective, his sense of the continuing timelines
and relevance of history. They enjoyed his self-effacing and selfdeprecating ways-he complained that no one would remember his
opinions. He was quite wrong about that. The truth is that no one
can forget his opinions. They are engraved in our jurisprudence,
they are part of the fabric of our laws. His opinions are the laws that
guide us and govern us. If the New Jersey Supreme Court has
achieved any measure of greatness over the years, Justice O'Hern has
a full share of the responsibility for that achievement.

40

Proceedings of the Supreme Court of NewJersey, 156 N.J. XLV, LXIX (1997).

